### 1NC

I negate.

1. All ethical knowledge is uncertain. Macintyre 81 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, 1981

The most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which an agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view [S]ince every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given. ‘Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles. If [I] the enquirer still goes on ask ing ‘But why should I live like that?’ then there is no further answer to give him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, [we have already] said everything that could be included in the further answer.’ (Hare 1952, p. 69). The terminus of justification is thus always, on this view, a not further to be justified choice, a choice unguided by criteria. **Each** individual implicitly or explicitly **has to** **adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice**. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and for that will its principles have and can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them.

2. There is a disparity between how we internally view the world and how it externally occurs. No reconciliation of this. Frank 11 Where is Now? The Paradox of The Present. NPR July 26 2011

Every aspect of our personal now is a layered impression of a world already lost to the past. To understand how this works, consider the simple fact discussed in last week’s post all we know about the world comes to us via signals: light wa ves, sound waves, and electrical impulses running along our nerves. These signals move at a finite speed. It always takes some finite amount of time for the signal to travel from the world to your body’s sensors and on to your brain. A distant galaxy, a distant mountain peak, [and] the not very distant light fixture on the ceiling and even the intimacy of a loved one’s face all live in the past. Those overlapping pasts are times that you – in your “now” – are no longer a part of. Signal travel time constitutes a delay and all those overlapping delays constitute an essential separation. The inner world of your experience is in a temporal sense cut off from the outer world you inhabit.

3. We can’t find truth since we can never escape our arbitrary foundations – they are the lens through which we will see all new arguments.

Street 06

Street, Sharon. “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” Philosophical Studies January 2006. Pgs 118-121Where I think the objection goes wrong, then, is as follows. The objection gains its plausibility by suggesting that rational reflection provides some means of standing apart from our evaluative judgments, sorting through them, and gradually separating out the true ones from the false—as if with the aid of some uncontaminated tool. But this picture cannot be right. For what rational reflection about evaluative matters involves, inescapably, is assessing some evaluative judgments in terms of others. Rational reflection must always proceed from some evaluative standpoint; it must work from some evaluative premises; it must treat some evaluative judgments as fixed, if only for the time being, as the assessment of other evaluative judgments is undertaken. In rational reflection, one does not stand completely apart from one’s starting fund of evaluative judgments: rather, one uses them, reasons in terms of them, holds some of them up for examination in light of others. The widespread consensus that the method of reflective equilibrium, broadly understood, is our sole means of proceeding in ethics is an acknowledgment of this fact: ultimately, we can test our evaluative judgments only by testing their consistency with our other evaluative judgments, combined of course with judgments about the (nonevaluative) facts. Thus, if the fund of evaluative judgments with which human reflection began was thoroughly contaminated with illegitimate influence—and the objector has offered no reason to doubt this part of the argument—then the tools of rational reflection were equally contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former. It follows that all our reflection over the ages has really just been a process of assessing evaluative judgments that are mostly off the mark in terms of others that are mostly off the mark. And reflection of this kind isn’t going to get one any closer to evaluative truth, any more than sorting through contaminated materials with contaminated tools is going to get one closer to purity. So long as we assume that there is no relation between evolutionary influences and evaluative truth, the appeal to rational reflection offers no escape from the conclusion that, in the absence of an incredible coincidence, most of our evaluative judgments are likely to be false.

[Facts aren’t true or false – they fluctuate based on what is good for us to believe.

**JAMES:**

Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking - William James 1907. Print

Take, for instance, yonder object on the wall. **You and I consider [the object on the wall] to be a “clock.” Although no one of us has seen the hidden works that make it one. We let our notion pass for true without attempting to verify.** **If truths mean verification-process** essentially, **ought we then to call such unverified truths as this abortive? No, for they form the overwhelmingly large number of the truths we live by.** Indirect as well as direct verifications pass muster. Where circumstantial evidence is sufficient, we can go without eye-witnessing. Just as **we** here **assume Japan to exist without ever having been there, because it** works**to do so,** everything we know conspiring with the belief, and nothing interfering, so we assume that thing to be a clock. We use it as a clock, regulating the length of our lecture by it. The verification of the assumption here means its leading to no frustration or contradiction. Verifiability of wheels and weights and pendulum is as good as verification. **For one truth-process completed there are a** million **in our lives that function in this state of nascency**. They turn us towards direct verification; lead us into the surroundings of the objects they envisage; and then, if everything runs on harmoniously, **we are so sure** that **verification is possible that we omit it, and are usually justified by all that happens.]**

And, even if there are objective truths, my arguments don’t deny that, rather explain that they are inaccessible. My arguments have to do with truth in general so this links into all interps of the resolution, not just a moral one.

This negates since actions can’t be obligatory. Things can only be justified from a perspective and there’s no subject in the resolution, merely a setting. Even if there was an actor specified

**Firstly**, my evidence says it’s impossible to aggregate perspectives, so relativist or government frameworks can’t reconcile the problem.

**Secondly**, even if that unit sees the resolution as something good, they are merely permitted to take that action, but there is no force out there to oblige them to do it – everyone’s free to do what they want.

**Thirdly**, the resolution wouldn’t be true because the converse of the resolution is just as valid, and since the resolution is phrased as an objective statement, you would negate.

**Fourthly,** if there’s a government agent specified, there’s not a part of that agent specified. We don’t know what part of the criminal justice system generates its will – we don’t know if its an internal force or an external force like Congress or the Legislature. Even if it was the latter, or we could resolve it through public opinion, those fail since those are contingent on a majority basis, but my evidence says we can only evaluate from an individual viewpoint.

This applies to legal obligations as well since my argument is the right thing, even in a legal sense, can’t exist universally. But, these would devolve into moral obligations anyway since we create laws for our societies based on if they’re good or bad, but that is relative to interpretation.

And, presume neg

1. Burden of proof. They have the theoretical burden to prove the res true, so if there’s no offense, then there’s no reason to believe the truth of the resolution, and you negate.
2. Strategy skew.
   1. aff speaking first, setting the terms for the debate, forcing the neg to shift strategy.
   2. aff speaking last, allowing it to have the last word and do meta-weighing between 1ar and NR weighing on theory and substance.
   3. aff getting more speeches, meaning more strategic ability to kick stuff, develop new positions, and choose outs

### AT Justifies Atrocities

1. Skep as I run it only concerns the **process** of not being able to know objective things. It doesn’t deal with conclusions in the specific, so I don’t justify anything bad, and you link since you’re the one making that link to my position.
2. My argument is that nothing is always true but that there can only be situational truth – truth exists in contexts. We can still say specific events like genocide are bad while making the general claim that life might not always be a prerequisite because there could be something bigger out there, we just don’t know.
3. Skep takes out because yore appealing to intuitions which skep says are unjustified and arbitrary. Even if its prefiat, you’re still making a moral claim about what the judge should do but the judge doesn’t have the same morals as you so you need a framework to tell them what they should vote on that is good in the real world.
4. If the position is so offensive then there are intuitive answers to be made substantively. This means that you can beat me on my own game which will deter the strategy in the future because its not seen as something that’s an auto-win, but also you isolate the parts of it that are flawed which makes people less likely to believe in them.
5. You say my position justifies genocide, but that comparison trivializes the most horrific examples of such an atrocity.

Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 95

Consequently the word ‘genocide’ has often been used when **making comparisons with later massacres** throughout the world in order to attract attention by evoking images of the concentration camps and their victims**.** The Second World War and the **genocide became absolute references** in the political context. As Alain Finkielkraut puts it, “Satan became incarnate in the person of Hitler who represented nothing less than an allegory for the devil.” Fascism became the supreme enemy and all political adversaries were indiscriminately accused of supporting it. But it was genocide became **the ultimate verbal stigma**, a term used both to describe any thoroughly horrendous, thoroughly fascist act perpetuated by an enemy and as a tallying call for minority groups looking to assert their identity and legitimate their existence. Thus the word genocide [and] fell **victim** to a sort of verbal inflation, in much the same as happened with the word fascist. It has applied freely and indiscriminately to groups as diverse as the blacks of South Africa, Palestinians, and women, as well as in reference to animals, abortion, famines, and widespread malnutrition, and to many other situations. The term genocide has progressively [It] lost its **initial** meaning and is becoming dangerously commonplace. In order to shock people and gain their attention to contemporary situations of violence or injustice by making comparisons with murder on the greatest scale known in this century, “genocide” has been used as synonymous with massacre, oppression and repression, overlooking that what lies behind the image it evokes is the attempted annihilation of the entire Jewish race. One of the aims of this book is to restore the specific meaning to a term which has been so much abused that it has become the victim of its own success. Further trivialization has resulted from the over use of the term “Holocaust,” first popularized on a wide scale in the 1970s by the American television series with that title. The original context is of course religious and means, literally, a “ritual sacrifice wholly consumed by fire.” The use of this term has a twofold effect**, both** mystifying and spectacular which distorts and denies reality.

Genocide must only be reserved for the most horrible situations, else we justify fatalism.

1. Rieff, The New Republic, 96

Destexhe is Lenkin’s faithful and eloquent disciple. His book is a polemic that calls unabashedly for a return to the most austere and limited definition of genocide. **“In order to shock people into paying attention to contemporary situations that reflect varying degrees of violence** or injustice by making comparisons with murder on the greatest scale known in this century, **genocide has been used in ways synonymous with massacre**, oppression, and repression, overlooking the fact that the image it conhjures up was an attempt to annihilate the whole Jewish race.” His aim, Destexhe insists, “is to restore the specific meaning to a term which has been so much abused that it has become the victim of its own success.” Like many of his colleagues at MSF, Destexhe is still marked by the intellectual influence of May ’68. He worries about the debasement of language and the distortions of a media-saturated culture. And so he insists on strict constructions. In a world where every rime can be called a genocide – the “hunger holocaust” is one example of verbal inflation that particularly infuriated him – how can there be a serious morality or serious rationality? Destexhe proposes that the term “genocide” be limited to situations where all counts enumerated in the Genocide Convention apply, and to no others. “**Genocide,**” he writes, “**must be reinstated as the most infamous of crimes, the memory of victims preserved and those responsible identified and brought to justice by the international community**.” The anger is tonic and necessary, and it comes from a different intellectual and moral universe than that which informs most writing on genocide. The sentimentality and the lack of grounding in real experience, the weakness for thinking metaphorically about the most concrete of human tragedies, the Jimmy Carter-like need to understand everyone’s point of view – all tendencies that are exemplified by the work on genocide of Robert Jay Linon and others – are wholly absent from Destexhe’s discussion. His moralism is based on the need to make distinctions between tragedies. **When Auschwitz equals Hiroshima, and Hiroshima equals Dresden,** and the crimes of the Wafen SS equal the crimes of the Americans in Vietnam, Destexhe insists, “**the real meaning of genocide will continue to be trivialized, and this most antihuman of all crimes will continue to be regarded as one more reason to justify fatalism.”**

Genocide trivialization means less of the problems will be stopped because there will be too many to do anything about

Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide, 95

Finally, there is the larger question of **international responsibility** which **varies according to the crime committed. When all such crimes are collated under one heading, the obligation on the part of the international community to intervene is more easily overlooked. Certainly, the international community cannot be expected to resolve every conflict** and, until the end of the Cold War, international intervention to end the large-scale killings was not easy with two superpowers ruling the world. But the international context has now changed and the principal obstacles to intervention lie more in western public opinion than in any physical constraints on the ground. In the case of genocide, there is an international convention which binds the signatories to recognize that this is a crime against the whole of humanity.

And genocide trivialization reduces our ability to blame anyone for the atrocities.

Destexhe

**Intrinsic meaning is lost when a word is used so loosely as to describe any human disaster** with a large number of victims, regardless of the cause. As a further consequence, **we arrive at a situation where no individuals are to be singled out as guilty or responsible** **because blame is laid at the door of historical fate and** “unfortunate circumstances,” **“the climate of the time”** and sheer bad luck. It would be hard to deny that some form of evil has always existed in the world. But if such evil is seen in general, impersonal terms such as barbarism, “man’s inhumanity to man,” chance circumstance or plain hatred, then there are no individual culprits at whom an accusing finger can be pointed. On the other hand, **if everyone is considered to be somehow involved and therefore somehow responsible, then the picture becomes hazy and guilt and innocence are somehow confused. This so-called collective blame is just another way of denying the facts.**

### AT Other Theories Solve

AT Relativism

1. You can’t affirm through a perspective – moral statements are intended as objective truth. Shafer-Landau 03

Shafer-Landau, Russ, Moral Realism: a Defense, pg. 23, 2003

Only Cognitivism straightforwardly preserves ordinary talk of moral truth. We appear to take at face value such locutions as ‘it is true that infanticide is wrong’. We allow for the possibility of moral mistake and often characterize it as a case in which a person speaks falsely, or has a false belief. When we experience moral perplexity, we often see ourselves as engaged in a search for the truth about who is in the right, or where our obligations lie. We can well explain the point and persistence of moral disagreement by attributing to agents the presupposition that there is a right answer awaiting discovery. Were they convinced that there was no truth of the matter, most interlocutors would see their continued disagreement as pointless; as pointless as, say, entering an intractable debate about whether red or orange was really the most beautiful colour. Relatedly, we believe that moral argument can take the logical form of other kinds of argument. We think of sentential operators in moral sentences as truth-functional. The law of excluded middle holds as strictly for moral discourse as for non-moral discourse. We recognize the validity of modus ponens inferences that incorporate moral claims as premises. We freely use the logical connectives in making and evaluating moral claims. We standardly assess moral arguments as valid or invalid, sound or unsound. This indicates at least a tacit assumption that truth-preservation is an aim of moral argument. Cognitivists have ready, straightforward analyses of such a view of moral argument. Non-cognitivists don’t.

2. Negates, even if they believe the resolution, they don’t care enough to act on it.

a. their preferences for the squo are stronger

b. they clearly are not obligated, but just permitted

3. Everyone is equally valid in his or her beliefs so opinions of the people who don’t agree have as much weight as the majority – both are permissible and you negate.

AT Apriori Truth

1. Skep says no transcendent truth. All the knowledge we know is from our limited experience.
2. Based on the premise that everyone has the capacity to access it through logic, but all my evidence says judgments are made arbitrarily.
3. Logic requires objectivity, which subjectivity directly takes out.
4. Apriori truth might dodge these problems, but the whole point is that we only experience our “now” and would never fully understand it, so even if it exists its not relevant to us.

### AT Denying Terms Triggers Presumption

1. Conflation – I don’t deny terms in the sense that they are grammatically false or that they don’t mean what you say they do. The resolution is still a coherent concept, its just not true
2. Presumption is only triggered when there’s no offense but
   1. The arguments for why it should negate are offense
   2. If the resolution is nonsensical, we can’t affirm it so that’s offense for me
3. Assumes truth testing, which is not justified – my argument is you can’t justify your advocacy as being normatively good, so you can’t prove your aff better than my neg
4. We can still evaluate nonsensical statements – I should become a cow is utter nonsense, but we can still determine if it would be a good or bad thing to do.

### Skep Outweighs Theory

1. Skep denies objective obligations which takes out the arg about what you have to do as a judge based on your ballot question
2. Fairness is a normative concept – if equality isn’t objective valuable you don’t need to vote on the theory argument
3. Skep is especially true on theory because truth literally varies from round to round – plans can be good in one but not in another